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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 11-1995
______________
C.R. BARD, INC.,
Appellant
v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
(D.N.J. No. 2-07-cv-01895)
______________
No. 11-1996
______________
C.R. BARD, INC.,
Appellant
v.
LEXINGTON INSURANCE CO., AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY
LINES INSURANCE CO.
(D.N.J. No. 2-07-cv-02547)
_________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
_________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 27, 2012
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
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(Filed: April 2, 2012)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff C.R. Bard, Inc. (“Bard”), seeking insurance coverage related to two
underlying product disparagement suits, brought the instant consolidated actions against
defendants Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (“Liberty”), Lexington Insurance Co.
(“Lexington”), and American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co. (“AISLIC”)
(collectively, Liberty, Lexington, and AISLIC are the “Defendants”). The District Court
granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Bard appealed. We will affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Underlying Actions
Bard is a leading manufacturer of urological medical products, including Foley
catheters.

Bard generally sells these products directly to either hospitals or group

purchasing organizations, which in turn supply multiple health facilities.
In 1998, Rochester Medical Corporation—one of Bard’s competitors—introduced
a new Foley catheter called the Release-Nitrofurazone Anti-Infection Foley Catheter (the
“Rochester Catheter”).

According to Rochester, this new catheter releases an anti-

microbial agent, nitrofurazone, into the catheter/urethra interface to protect the urethral
tract and bladder tissues from infection. Bard’s Foley catheter competed directly with the
Rochester Catheter.
2

In 2004, Rochester sued Bard in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas in an action captioned Rochester Medical Corp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc. et al.,
No. 5:04-cv-00060-DF (the “Rochester Action”). This action alleged, inter alia, that
Bard unlawfully disparaged the Rochester Catheter by intentionally misrepresenting to
prospective Rochester Catheter purchasers that nitrofurazone is an “antibiotic when it is
in fact a bactericidal.” Rochester Am. Compl. ¶ 28 (emphasis in original). 1 Rochester’s
complaint further asserted that Bard
instructed [its] sales personnel to misrepresent to customers that the
[Rochester Catheter] could foster the development and spread of antibioticresistant pathogens, the so-called “super bugs,” that comprise a nationally
recognized serious threat for hospital patients, hospitals and the general
public and further misrepresented by implication, intentional omissions and
direct comparisons with their own product that the silver used in the Bard
product was far less likely to cause acquired antibiotic resistance than the
nitrofurazone used in the [Rochester Catheter] despite the fact that the
antibiotic resistance profiles of both silver and nitrofurazone are identical,
each being rated as rare.
Id.

Rochester’s complaint listed specific examples of Bard’s unlawful disparaging

statements, which included:
a.

[R]epresenting by letter dated April 16, 2002 from Bard’s Medical
Division Manager, Rob Hansen, to Fred Gordon at Catholic Health
Services that “nitrofurazone . . . is an antibiotic” [; and]
*

b.

*

*

Publishing or causing to be published in August of 1998 an article
by Harriet A. Carr in Infection Control Today which refers to the

1

Rochester’s complaint further alleged that Bard and others: violated federal and state
antitrust laws; and tortiously interfered with Rochester’s existing and prospective
business relationships and contracts. Bard is not seeking insurance coverage with respect
to these claims.
3

[Rochester Catheter] as “a catheter impregnated with the antibiotic
nitrofurazone.” The article further states that the Rochester
[C]atheter may contribute to the further development of antibiotic
resistant neuropathogens. The article further states that “silver (used
by Bard) has been used extensively to prevent infections and
resistance by microorganisms to silver is rare.”
Id.
In December 2006, Bard settled the Rochester Action for $49 million. Bard
asserts that it spent approximately $18 million to defend the Rochester Action.
In February 2007, Southeast Missouri Hospital (“Southeast”), a purchaser of
urethral catheters, filed a putative class action suit against Bard and others in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, captioned Southeast Missouri
Hospital et al. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00031-TCM (the “Southeast Action”)
(collectively, the Rochester and Southeast Actions are the “Underlying Actions”).
Southeast’s complaint alleged that the putative class members paid inflated prices as a
result of Bard’s anticompetitive conduct. The Southeast plaintiffs asserted, inter alia,
that Bard “engag[ed] in a campaign of disparagement and misinformation” about the
Rochester Catheter’s likelihood of fostering the development and spread of antibioticresistant pathogens. Southeast Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“Southeast
complaint”) ¶ 45 (taken nearly verbatim from the Rochester complaint). 2 The Southeast
complaint, like the Rochester complaint, asserted examples of Bard’s alleged disparaging
conduct, including the aforementioned April 16, 2002 letter by Hansen and the August
2

The Southeast Action also asserted claims for violations of the federal and state antitrust
laws and for civil conspiracy. Southeast Compl. ¶¶ 85-133. Bard is not seeking
insurance coverage with respect to these claims.
4

1998 article by Carr. Id.¶ 46.
On October 6, 2008, the Southeast plaintiffs, through their class representative,
consented to dismiss their disparagement claim. Southeast Action, Dkt. No. 211 ¶ 6.
Bard asserts that it spent approximately $17 million defending the Southeast Action.
Bard’s Insurance Policies
Medmarc Casualty Co. (“Medmarc”) issued insurance policies to Bard that were
effective from January 1, 1997 through April 1, 2003. Bard is not seeking insurance
coverage with respect to these policies.
After Medmarc’s policies were no longer effective, Bard obtained various policies
from Defendants. The following insurance policies are at issue in this appeal: (1) three
consecutive policies issued by Liberty to Bard that were in effect from April 1, 2003
through April 1, 2006 (the “Liberty Policies”); (2) the policy issued by AISLIC to Bard
that was in effect from April 1, 2003 through April 1, 2004 (the “AISLIC Policy”); and
(3) the policy issued by Lexington that was in effect from April 1, 2006 through April 1,
2007 (the “Lexington Policy”) (collectively, the Liberty, AISLIC, and Lexington Policies
are “Defendants’ Policies”).
It is undisputed that Defendants’ Policies provide Bard coverage for “Advertising
Injury,” which includes coverage for Bard’s alleged disparagement of a competitor’s

5

products. 3 It is further undisputed that Defendants’ Policies include prior publication
exception clauses (“PPECs”), which exclude coverage for advertising injuries arising out
of oral or written material whose first publication took place before the beginning of the
relevant policy period. 4 The purpose of PPECs is generally to prevent a person who has
already caused an injury from purchasing insurance so that he could continue the
injurious behavior.
Procedural Background
In July 2005, Medmarc commenced an action against Bard in New Jersey state
court (the “Medmarc Action”) seeking a declaration that it was not liable to reimburse or
indemnify Bard for the Rochester Action (the Southeast Action had yet to be filed). Bard
brought a counterclaim against Medmarc, seeking coverage for both of the Underlying
3

The Liberty Policies require Liberty to pay certain sums that Bard becomes “legally
obligated to pay as damages because of ‘advertising injury.’” A122 § 1(a). Advertising
injury is defined in the Liberty Policies to include injury arising out of, inter alia, “[o]ral
or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or
organization or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services.” Id.
§ 2(a)(1).
The AISLIC and Lexington Policies state that the insurer will pay certain sums
that Bard becomes “legally obligated to pay as damages by reason of liability imposed by
law because of . . . Advertising Injury to which this insurance applies.” A3479 § I(A);
A3512 § I(A). Advertising injury is defined in the AISLIC and Lexington Policies as an
injury arising out of Bard’s business from, inter alia, an “oral or written publication, in
any manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or organization, or disparages a
person’s or organization’s goods, products or services.” A3499 at M(4); A3530 at M(4).
4

The Liberty PPECs state that the policies do not apply to advertising injuries “arising
out of oral or written publication of material whose first publication took place before the
beginning of the policy period.” A123 § 4(b).
Similarly, the AISLIC and Lexington PPECs provide that their respective policies
exclude coverage for advertising injuries “arising out of oral, written or electronic
publication, in any manner, of material whose first publication took place before the
beginning of the Policy Period.” A3489 at S(3); A3521 at S(3).
6

Actions.

On March 17, 2008, the trial court granted Bard’s motion for summary

judgment, and ordered that Medmarc reimburse Bard for “the defense costs incurred that
are reasonably associated with the business disparagement claim, and the Lanham Act
claim” in the Rochester Action. See Order of Hon. Marianne Espinosa, J.S.C., dated
Mar. 17, 2008, A409. In a response to this order, Bard asserted that “all of the legal
expenses incurred by Bard in the defense of the Rochester [Action] are recoverable from
Medmarc.” A4561 (Ltr. dated Apr. 8, 2008 from Bard’s counsel). Bard further stated
that Medmarc was responsible for $15,533,302.00 of Bard’s total asserted legal costs of
$17,159,648.38. A4562. 5
On March 12, 2007, Bard commenced an action in New Jersey state court against
Liberty. Bard sought to recover indemnification and defense costs under the Liberty
Policies that it incurred as a result of the Underlying Actions (the “Liberty Action”). On
April 23, 2007, Bard commenced a separate action in New Jersey state court asserting
similar allegations against Lexington under the Lexington Policy (the “Lexington
Action”). Liberty and Lexington removed their respective actions to the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, pursuant to, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332,
1441, and 1446. On March 24, 2010, Bard filed an amended complaint in the Lexington
Action joining substantially similar claims against AISLIC. On May 24, 2010, the
Liberty and Lexington Actions were consolidated for discovery purposes.
On December 30, 2010, the District Court denied Bard’s cross-motion for
5

The remaining $1,626,346.38, for which Bard agreed Medmarc was not responsible,
related to antitrust research issues provided by National Economic Research Associates.
A4562 (Ltr. dated Apr. 8, 2008).
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summary judgment seeking a declaration that the Lexington Policy provides coverage for
Bard’s defense costs in the Underlying Actions. On March 11, 2011, the District Court
granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that the respective
PPECs precluded coverage, and denied Bard’s motions for partial summary judgment. 6
Bard timely appealed.
II.

ANALYSIS 7

Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law. See Gasperini
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). “With respect to an issue of state
law in a diversity case, when there is no decision from the state’s highest court directly
on point, we are charged with predicting how that court would resolve the question at
issue.” Colliers Lanard & Axilbund v. Lloyds of London, 458 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.
2006) (citing Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 435 F.3d 431, 436 (3d
Cir. 2006)). When predicting how a state’s highest court would resolve the issue, we

6

Bard sought a declaration that: (1) the Lexington and AISLIC PPECs were void under
New Jersey law; and (2) AISLIC and Liberty had a duty to reimburse Bard for defense
costs in the Underlying Actions.
7

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the District Court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion de
novo, applying the same standard as the District Court. Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380,
385 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007)). “The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). All inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
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must consider: “(1) what that court has said in related areas; (2) the decisional law of the
state intermediate courts; (3) federal cases interpreting state law; and (4) decisions from
other jurisdictions that have discussed the issue.” Id.
Several principles of New Jersey insurance law are relevant to this diversity
action. 8 Courts should interpret insurance policies according to their plain, ordinary
meaning. Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 869 A.2d 929, 933 (N.J. 2005)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Colliers Lanard & Axilbund, 458 F.3d at
236. “If the policy language is clear, the policy should be interpreted as written, [but] [i]f
the policy is ambiguous, the policy will be construed in favor of the insured.” Nav-Its,
869 A.2d at 933 (citations omitted).
Insurers have the burden of demonstrating the applicability of any exclusion to
the policy. Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 698 A.2d 9, 17 (N.J. 1997). Although
courts should narrowly construe exclusions to an insurance policy, “exclusions are
presumptively valid and will be given effect if specific, plain, clear, prominent, and not
contrary to public policy.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
A.

THE PPECS IN DEFENDANTS’ POLICIES EXCLUDE
BARD’S CLAIMS FOR INDEMNIFICATION

Defendants do not dispute that the complaints in the Underlying Actions allege
advertising injury within the scope of Defendants’ Policies. Instead, Defendants argue
that the District Court properly concluded that coverage for those claims is excluded
under the plain language of the PPECs. We agree.
8

The parties agree that Defendants’ Policies are subject to New Jersey law.
9

Under the PPECs, Defendants’ Policies do not cover advertising injury arising
from materials that were first published by Bard prior to the relevant policy periods. We
conclude that, under these circumstances, the PPECs are unambiguous, written in plain
language, and were clearly presented to Bard as an exception to the policies. Defendants’
Policies first went into effect on April 1, 2003, and thus, advertising injuries arising out
of materials first published before April 1, 2003 are excluded.
Bard argues that the PPECs are inapplicable under the circumstances because the
allegedly disparaging statements it made about Rochester’s products during the policy
periods were not identical to the statements it made prior to April 1, 2003. Defendants
counter that, for allegedly disparaging statements made during the policy period to be
excluded under the PPEC, those statements need only be substantively similar in content
to the prior statements, not identical.
The parties have not cited, nor are we aware of, any decisions by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, New Jersey intermediate courts, or federal appellate courts applying
New Jersey law that directly address whether a PPEC applies under the instant
circumstances. Thus, we may look to other courts. The Seventh Circuit in Taco Bell
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., concluded that for a republication of unlawful
material during the policy period to fall outside of a PPEC and be covered under the
policy, that republication must “contain[] new matter that the plaintiff in the liability suit
against the insured alleges as fresh wrongs.” 388 F.3d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 2004). We
have found Taco Bell’s reasoning persuasive in other decisions. See, e.g., Transp. Ins.
Co. v. Pa. Mfrs.’ Assoc. Ins. Co., 346 F. App’x 862, 867 (3d Cir. 2009) (interpreting a
10

PPEC under Pennsylvania law and concluding that “[u]nless later publications contained
‘new matter’—i.e., substantively different content—that the [underlying] complaint
‘allege[d] [were] fresh wrongs,’ the ‘prior publication’ exclusion applies” (quoting Taco
Bell, 388 F.3d at 1073)). We predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt a
construction of the PPEC similar to that of Taco Bell and Transportation Insurance.
Here, the content of Bard’s allegedly disparaging statements made during the
policy periods were substantively similar to the content of statements made prior to April
1, 2003. Compare A4694-95 (an article dated Aug. 1998 by Harriette Carr, a Bard
employee, asserting that nitrofurazone is an antibiotic and that the Rochester Catheter
may further development of antibiotic-resistant pathogens); A2500, A2502, A2504 (a
conversation in late 1998 between Patrick McFadden and Dick Booth, both Bard
employees, and representatives of Johns Hopkins Hospital in which McFadden and Booth
asserted that a catheter with nitrofurazone may lead to bacterial resistance); A6377,
A6383, A6401 (a Bard presentation in Apr. 2001 asserting that the Rochester Catheter
was not effective against all bacteria); A6420 (a letter dated Apr. 16, 2002 from Rob
Hanson, a Bard employee, to a representative of Catholic Health Services stating that
nitrofurazone is an antibiotic); A6432-33 (a Bard presentation dated Feb. 28, 2003, which
asserted that nitrofurazone has an embryocidal effect in rabbits and that the Rochester
Catheter is not effective against certain gram-negative bacilli or yeasts); with A6459-60
(a Bard presentation dated Aug. 4, 2003 containing identical material to the Feb. 28, 2003
presentation discussed supra); A6514, A6449 (a presentation by Carr dated Nov. 2003,
asserting that there is a concern about resistance related to the “antibiotic coated”
11

Rochester Catheter); A6520-21 (Bard’s approved response to Rochester’s statement
regarding its Catheter, dated Feb. 13-14, 2007, which asserted that Rochester’s Catheter
is “not effective against yeast and may allow overgrowth of non-susceptible
organisms”). 9
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in concluding the PPECs in
Defendants’ Policies exclude Bard’s claims for indemnification. 10
B.

DEFENDANTS HAVE NO DUTY TO DEFEND OR REIMBURSE BARD FOR

9

Bard argues that four certifications executed by its employees create a genuine dispute
of material fact. See, e.g., Pl.’s Br. at 40-43, A5193 (“No two alleged defamation [sic]
statements by Bard in its sales and marketing efforts were substantially similar, let alone
the same.” ). Such conclusory statements cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 197 (3d Cir. 2009).
Moreover, Bard has not pointed to sufficient evidence demonstrating how the content of
its statements made after April 1, 2003 were both allegedly disparaging and substantively
different from its prior statements so as to constitute fresh wrongs as asserted by
Rochester and Southeast.
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Bard further asserts that the Lexington and AISLIC PPECs violate New Jersey public
policy because they are claims-made policies—as opposed to occurrence-based
policies—that do not provide reasonable retroactive coverage. Pl.’s Br. at 46-53 (citing
Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1985) (concluding that claims-made
policies providing no retroactive coverage violate public policy)). Courts applying New
Jersey law, however, have concluded that exclusions in claims-made policies can be
consistent with New Jersey public policy. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 495 A.2d 395, 403-04 (N.J. 1985) (concluding that public policy was not violated by
a claims-made policy that generally provided retroactive coverage but excluded coverage
of certain claims that the insured knew, or could have reasonably foreseen, might lead to
a claim); see also Colliers Lanard & Axilbund, 458 F.3d at 239-40 (same).
Here, the Lexington and AISLIC Policies, as opposed to the policy at issue in
Sparks, provide retroactive coverage for several types of claims, including bodily injury,
property damage, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and wrongful eviction. The PPECs
only limit personal and advertising injury, and they were intended to prevent a person
from purchasing insurance in order to continue his injurious behavior. See, e.g., Taco
Bell, 388 F.3d at 1072-73. Thus, Lexington and AISLIC’s PPECs do not violate New
Jersey public policy.
12

DEFENSE COSTS RELATED TO THE UNDERLYING ACTIONS
Under New Jersey law, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.
S.T. Hudson Eng’rs Inc. v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Co., 909 A.2d 1156, 1164 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2006). “The duty to defend is triggered by the filing of a complaint alleging a
covered claim.” Abouzaid v. Mansgard Gardens Assocs., 23 A.3d 338, 346 (N.J. 2011).
“The complaint should be laid alongside the policy and a determination made as to
whether, if the allegations are sustained, the insurer will be required to pay the resulting
judgment, and in reaching a conclusion, doubts should be resolved in favor of the
insured.” Id.
Here, the disparagement claims in the Underlying Actions clearly fall within the
PPECs. Rochester’s complaint alleged that Bard disparaged the Rochester Catheter by
falsely stating it was an antibiotic that could foster the development of antibiotic-resistant
pathogens and that Bard’s silver Foley catheter did not have the same concerns.
Rochester Am. Compl. ¶ 28. Rochester’s complaint further listed specific disparaging
statements it attributes to Bard employees, several of which occurred prior to April 1,
2003. Southeast’s disparagement claim appears to have been taken nearly verbatim from
Rochester’s claim. Southeast Compl. ¶ 46. There is no indication in either the Rochester
or Southeast complaints that the content of Bard’s alleged disparaging statements
substantively changed after April 1, 2003. In other words, the complaints contain no
allegations of fresh wrongs occurring during the policy periods.

Consequently, the

PPECs exclude coverage on the face of the complaints and the District Court did not err
in concluding that Defendants have no duty to defend or reimburse Bard for defense costs
13

related to the Underlying Actions. 11
Accordingly, we will affirm.
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Bard also moved to file its unredacted appellate brief and certain documents in the
record under seal. Bard asserts that these documents contain highly sensitive proprietary
and confidential information and, its appellate brief notwithstanding, were filed under
seal with the District Court. Defendants have also moved to file their respective
unredacted appellate briefs under seal because they rely on documents subject to Bard’s
motion to seal. We reviewed the documents at issue and conclude that they contain
proprietary and confidential information. Accordingly, we will grant all motions to seal.
Because these motions did not specify a desired duration for the sealing order, we will
direct the Clerk’s Office to seal the materials subject to the aforementioned motions for
five years from the conclusion of the case, after which the materials are to be unsealed
without notice to the parties. See Local App. R. 106.1(c)(2).
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